The Supreme Court’s War on Congress

Supreme Court Limits Private Lawsuits Under Alien Tort Statute and Religious Land Use Law

The Supreme Court issued rulings on June 23, 2026, in two cases involving the Alien Tort Statute and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. The decisions addressed the availability of private damages actions under those statutes.

In Cisco Systems v. Doe, the Court held that the Alien Tort Statute does not authorize federal courts to recognize new causes of action against domestic corporations for alleged violations of international law occurring abroad. The plaintiffs, who described themselves as members of a religious minority in China, alleged that Cisco Systems provided technology used by Chinese authorities in surveillance and detention. The Court concluded that judicial creation of such liability exceeds the statute’s text and separation-of-powers principles.

The Alien Tort Statute, enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, grants federal district courts jurisdiction over civil actions by aliens for torts committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (2004), the Court held that the statute permits courts to recognize a limited set of claims based on norms of international law that were recognized at the time of enactment, such as offenses against ambassadors, violations of safe conducts, and piracy. Justice David Souter’s opinion left open the possibility that additional claims could be recognized in the future.

Subsequent decisions narrowed that scope. In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (2013), the Court held that the statute does not apply to claims against foreign corporations when the relevant conduct occurred outside the United States. In Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC (2018), the Court held that foreign corporations cannot be defendants under the statute. In Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe (2021), the Court held that general corporate activity in the United States does not suffice to support an action.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett’s majority opinion in Cisco Systems stated that the Court has since Sosa consistently declined to create new implied causes of action. The opinion treated the recognition of corporate liability as an exercise of judicial lawmaking not authorized by the statute’s text. Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, arguing that the decision effectively overruled the framework established in Sosa without explicit acknowledgment.

In the second case, Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections, the Court held that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act does not authorize damages actions against state prison officials in their individual capacities. Damon Landor, a Rastafarian inmate, had grown his hair in accordance with his religious practice and had previously received exemptions. After transfer to a new facility, officials cut his hair despite receiving notice of a 2017 Fifth Circuit decision holding that such action would violate RLUIPA. Landor sued the department and the officials personally.

RLUIPA, enacted in 2000, applies to state and local governments that receive federal funding for correctional institutions. It requires that substantial burdens on religious exercise be justified by a compelling governmental interest and be the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. In Tanzin v. Tanvir (2020), the Court held that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act permits damages actions against federal officials in their individual capacities. The question in Landor was whether the same remedy is available under RLUIPA against state officials.

Justice Neil Gorsuch’s majority opinion framed the statute as an exercise of Congress’s Spending Clause authority. The opinion concluded that conditions attached to federal grants bind the recipient government but do not automatically create personal liability for individual employees who did not themselves enter into a contractual relationship with the federal government. The opinion noted that Congress could have drafted the statute to require officials to consent separately to personal suits.

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson dissented, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. The dissent argued that the Spending Clause analysis was inconsistent with prior precedent treating statutory conditions as enforceable obligations and that damages are often the only practical remedy available to prisoners under the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s restrictions on injunctive relief.

Both decisions addressed the circumstances under which federal statutes create private rights of action enforceable against particular defendants. The majority opinions emphasized statutory text and limits on implied remedies. The dissenting opinions emphasized continuity with earlier interpretations of the same statutes and the practical availability of relief.

The Court’s approach in these cases follows a line of decisions applying textual and structural analysis to questions of private enforcement. Earlier cases such as Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko (2001) and Ziglar v. Abbasi (2017) similarly declined to extend implied causes of action in new contexts. The outcomes reflect differing views on the proper judicial role when Congress has not expressly provided for damages against the defendants at issue.

The two rulings leave intact other avenues for relief under the respective statutes, including actions against governmental entities where sovereign immunity has been waived and claims for injunctive or declaratory relief where available. They also leave open the possibility that Congress could amend the statutes to address the remedies question directly.