Opinion | The Danger of Declaring ‘Once and for All’ in the Middle East - The New York Times

Thomas Friedman's NYT opinion piece delivers a valid reminder that military action alone rarely resolves Middle East conflicts, drawing on Israel's long history of Hamas assassinations—but it selectively highlights regeneration cycles while omitting verifiable tactical impacts and Hamas's documented rejection of political compromise.

Core Argument and Strengths

Friedman argues against declarations of "once and for all" military victories, using Israel's killings of three generations of Hamas leaders (e.g., Yahya Ayyash in 1996, Ahmed Yassin and Abdel Aziz Rantisi in 2004) as evidence that force must pair with politics for lasting change.

"The only way to eliminate a military threat once and for all is through force plus politics — by creating better, self-sustaining leadership on the other side."

What it gets right:

• Accurate historical timeline: Correctly lists key assassinations and Hamas's shift to governance and rockets, reflecting decades of reporting.
• Transparent perspective: As an opinion column, it openly advocates diplomacy alongside force, crediting Friedman's expertise from Beirut/Jerusalem bureaus (Pulitzer wins in 1983, 1988).
• Timely hook: Ties to 2026 U.S.-Iran strikes post-casualties, critiquing "pulverizing from the air" without pretending neutrality.

Key Techniques and Findings

• Cherry-picking timeline: Focuses on leader regeneration across 1996-2024 but truncates post-2004 context, implying no progress despite evidence of shifts.
• Framing pivot: Applies "once and for all" critique to Hegseth/Trump's Iran-specific rhetoric, broadening it to equate with Hamas policy without noting the distinct contexts.
• Source reliance without caveats: Builds thesis on author's rules, but Friedman's forecasting (e.g., 14+ missed Iraq "next six months" predictions, 2003-2006; Netanyahu resignation calls) goes unmentioned in a slot with a diplomacy-leaning tilt.

Verifiable Omissions and Impacts

The piece omits concrete data on assassination effects, which undercuts its "no progress in two generations" implication:

• Decline in suicide bombings: Hamas-led attacks peaked at 60+ in 2002, dropping to 2 in 2005 and 0 in 2006 after Yassin/Rantisi killings (Jewish Virtual Library data; Bank of Israel 2005 study).
• Short-term tactical gains: Post-Hamas military leader kills correlated with +0.5-0.7% Israeli market rises, indicating disruption/deterrence (Bank of Israel DP 05/02); mixed academic reviews confirm temporary operational setbacks (Hafez/Hatfield 2006; Kirchofer 2015 ICCT).
• Hamas's peace rejection: No mention of 1988 Covenant (Article 13: peace initiatives a "contradiction," jihad obligatory); 2006 Quartet conditions rejection; Oslo opposition—facts showing barriers to "better leadership" beyond Israeli action.

These gaps create an impression of military futility without balancing evidence of breathing room for politics (e.g., end of suicide era, Abraham Accords).

Author and Outlet Context

Friedman, NYT columnist since 1995, brings deep ME experience (*From Beirut to Jerusalem* National Book Award) and supports two-state solutions/Arab Peace Initiative. His "Friedman Unit" nickname stems from repeated short-timeline predictions that missed (FAIR.org tracking). NYT opinion often favors center-left diplomacy critiques of hardline policies.

Comparative Coverage

Other outlets offer fuller balances:

• Times of Israel: Highlights short-term disruptions/morale boosts from killings (Yassin 2004, Haniyeh 2024), citing 2017 U.S. study—more tactical nuance.
• Al Jazeera: Stresses long-term backfire (harder leaders, Iran ties post-Yassin), omitting attack drops—mirrors Friedman's negativity but qualitative.
• NBC/TIME: Note intelligence feats and replacements (e.g., al-Arouri 2024), including Hamas views—closer to mixed assessments.

Right-leaning outlets like JNS.org frame preemptive strikes as enabling "total victory," prioritizing military first.

Bottom line: Strong on the need for politics and historical facts, but weakened by selective evidence that tilts toward over-militarization blame. Readers gain insight into limits of force yet miss data showing it can create openings—solid opinion, not comprehensive brief.

Further Reading

• Times of Israel: Israel has long been good at assassinating enemies. Does it make a difference?
• Al Jazeera: Israel’s assassinations of Hamas and Hezbollah leaders will backfire
• JNS.org: Israel’s new preemptive strategy against Iran and Hezbollah
• Foreign Affairs: Israel Fighting a War It Cannot Win