The Art of War, Not the Deal

Retired Army Officer Outlines Phased Military Approach to Iran

"Therefore, the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him." — Sun Tzu, "The Art of War"

"War - an act of violence whose object is to constrain the enemy, to accomplish our will." — George Washington, General of the Continental Army

Allen West, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel and former member of Congress, marked Memorial Day by reflecting on U.S. military engagements with Iran and presenting a structured analysis of potential combat operations. West entered active duty as a Field Artillery second lieutenant on November 1, 1983, arriving at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, one week after the October 23, 1983, Beirut barracks bombing that killed 241 U.S. service members. He attributed the attack to a truck bomb carried out by Hezbollah, described by the U.S. government as a proxy of Iran.

West recounted his awareness of Iran during his university years, referencing the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the subsequent hostage crisis at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran that lasted 444 days. He stated that Iran has been in conflict with the United States since 1979, citing Iranian-supplied explosive force penetrators used against U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan as evidence of direct involvement. West rejected characterizations of U.S. actions as wars of choice, arguing that Iranian actions provided grounds for military response.

West referenced Sun Tzu’s “The Art of War,” which he studied as a junior officer, and emphasized the principle of imposing one’s will on an adversary. He listed the elements of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—and noted that diplomacy has historically been used alongside military operations. While West argued that negotiations with the current Iranian government have not produced lasting constraints on its regional activities, U.S. policy has long treated diplomacy as one available instrument within the broader toolkit of statecraft.

He described warfare as occurring at strategic, operational, and tactical levels, with objectives required to align. At the strategic level, West proposed actions to isolate Iran from external partners, identifying a network that includes China, Russia, North Korea, Venezuela, and various non-state actors. He pointed to recent U.S. measures against transnational criminal organizations and Venezuela as examples of incremental pressure and suggested similar sequencing could apply to Iran.

At the operational level, West identified control of the Strait of Hormuz as a central objective, referencing a 1990s contingency planning exercise in which he participated as operations officer for the 18th Field Artillery Brigade. The exercise simulated seizure of Bandar Abbas to secure the strait. He noted that uninterrupted energy transit through the waterway affects global markets and recommended consideration of adjacent islands and infrastructure such as Kharg Island. West also cited the need to interdict external arms shipments, including rail links from China.

At the tactical level, West stressed the importance of maintaining operational tempo to prevent an adversary from regrouping. He referenced the campaigns of Gen. George Patton in World War II as an illustration of sustained offensive action. West observed that pauses for negotiations can affect momentum, while also acknowledging that military campaigns involve defined phases with measurable objectives and transition criteria.

West discussed the concept of an adversary’s center of gravity—the element whose disruption would most directly affect its ability to continue operations. He stated that Iranian leadership has shown limited concern for domestic infrastructure in past internal unrest. He suggested that targeting revenue sources and foreign financial holdings of regime figures and their relatives could have greater effect. West further noted the value of information operations aimed at creating divisions between the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the regular armed forces, including historical methods such as leaflet dissemination under conditions of air superiority.

Drawing on Carl von Clausewitz’s “On War,” West referenced the “paradoxical trinity” of the people, the military, and the government. He argued that alignment among these elements is necessary for sustained operations and that current U.S. messaging has not achieved such coherence. West also referenced the War Powers Resolution, noting that previous administrations have conducted extended military activities without formal congressional authorization, including the 2011 Libya operation.

West concluded that Iran represents the next stage in addressing a broader set of state and non-state actors. He called for a coherent plan executed across multiple instruments of power rather than reliance on any single method. Military analysts have noted that large-scale operations against a country the size and geographic position of Iran would involve substantial logistical requirements, potential casualties, and extended post-conflict stabilization challenges, factors that have shaped prior U.S. decisions regarding direct intervention.

West closed by stating that combat operations ultimately involve the application of force and that clarity of objectives remains essential.