The Rising Danger of Iranian Sleeper Cells - Michael Rubin - The Dispatch

Concerns Over Iranian-Linked Networks Rise After U.S.-Israeli Campaign

By News Desk

March 11, 2026

Following the reported deaths of senior Iranian leaders and the degradation of Revolutionary Guards command structures during the recent U.S.-Israeli military operations, U.S. officials are monitoring reports of possible activation of Iranian-linked networks in the United States and Europe. An intercepted communication cited in media reports has prompted warnings about potential retaliatory actions, though the scale and confirmation of any such activation remain under assessment by intelligence agencies.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s status is unconfirmed in public reporting, while his son Mojtaba has been mentioned in some accounts as assuming interim responsibilities despite lacking senior clerical rank. Iranian state media and opposition sources continue to report internal power struggles. Iranian authorities have stated that any new leadership will maintain the Islamic Republic’s existing policies.

President Donald Trump has called for unconditional surrender by Iranian forces. Discussions within the administration have considered figures such as Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf and former President Hassan Rouhani for possible roles in a transitional arrangement, drawing comparisons to past U.S. approaches in other countries. Former Iranian crown prince Reza Pahlavi has sought support among opposition groups but has not secured broad coordination.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps maintains recruitment and training programs that include ideological components for younger participants through Basij-affiliated activities. U.S. intelligence assessments have long noted challenges in distinguishing between IRGC personnel motivated by salary and those committed to the organization’s core doctrine. Some former members have left service in recent weeks, according to reports from Iranian sources.

Historical records show that the Islamic Republic has conducted or supported operations outside Iran. These include the 1994 bombing in Buenos Aires, the 2012 attack in Bulgaria, and plots in Thailand, Georgia, and India targeting Israeli or Jewish interests. Iranian authorities have denied involvement in several of these cases. Domestically, the United States has charged individuals linked to Iranian networks in plots such as the 2011 scheme targeting the Saudi ambassador and 2022-2025 efforts against dissidents, including the sentencing of two Azerbaijani nationals in Manhattan federal court for a kidnapping plot.

U.S. law enforcement has disrupted multiple Iran-linked plots inside the United States in recent years. No successful IRGC-directed attack on U.S. soil has occurred since the 1980s, according to public records from the Department of Justice and FBI. In 2003, an Arkansas National Guard member with prior IRGC service was prosecuted on immigration-related charges after an investigation into suspicious inquiries. Federal authorities have stated that similar infiltration attempts have been detected and addressed through standard counterintelligence methods.

Iranian officials have historically described support for groups outside Iran as part of an “export of revolution” policy. IRGC-linked Telegram channels have issued calls for action against U.S. officials, including references to President Trump. Past statements from Iranian sources have named former officials such as Brian Hook and Mike Pompeo as targets. U.S. embassies and diplomatic facilities maintain enhanced security protocols in response to such threats.

The 1979-1980 period saw the severance of U.S.-Iran diplomatic relations after the embassy seizure and the assassination of dissident Ali Akbar Tabatabaei in Maryland by Dawud Salahuddin, a U.S. citizen recruited by Iranian agents. Salahuddin later resided in Iran and was the last confirmed contact with former FBI agent Robert Levinson before Levinson’s disappearance. Iranian authorities have not confirmed involvement in Levinson’s case.

Financial tracking of Iranian activities has been complicated by cash transfers, including the 2016 delivery of funds connected to hostage negotiations. U.S. Treasury officials have noted that cash movements are harder to monitor than electronic transfers. Iranian-American travelers to Iran have reported interrogations and device inspections upon entry, raising concerns about potential blackmail or recruitment, though the frequency and outcomes of such cases vary.

The U.S. Muslim population includes both Sunni and Shia communities. Organizations such as the Council on American-Islamic Relations and the Islamic Society of North America represent segments of the community but do not speak for all members. Some Shia mosques in the United States have held services referencing recent events in Iran, with varying tones reported by attendees and local media.

Public venues in the United States generally operate with lower visible security than comparable sites in Israel. Universities and large public events, including upcoming anniversary commemorations, have been identified by security analysts as requiring additional protective measures. Federal and local law enforcement agencies continue to issue guidance on reporting suspicious activity without regard to ethnicity or religion.

U.S. counterterrorism agencies have stated that they maintain active investigations into foreign influence and potential domestic networks tied to Iran. Officials emphasize that successful prevention depends on continued intelligence sharing and community cooperation.