The Supreme Court Reverses Inferior Court Supremacy In Alabama

Supreme Court Permits Alabama to Proceed With Revised Legislative Maps in Voting Rights Dispute

Late Tuesday, the Supreme Court granted Alabama's emergency application to implement new state legislative district maps. The per curiam order referenced the Court's earlier decision in Callais and applied its reasoning to claims of vote dilution under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The opinion's analysis of the merits occupied a single paragraph and focused on the district court's treatment of the state's response to a prior remedial order.

The Court stated that the district court had not applied the presumption of legislative good faith established in Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, 602 U. S. 1 (2024). It noted that the lower court had treated the state's legal disagreement with an earlier remedial order as evidence of discriminatory intent, citing Abbott v. Perez, 585 U. S. 579, 608–609 (2018). The earlier district court order had been vacated by the Supreme Court before Alabama adopted its new map.

Alabama had drawn and enacted a map that state officials viewed as consistent with existing Supreme Court precedent on vote dilution. The district court rejected that map. Alabama maintained that it retained the right to enact legislation while the validity of the prior order remained subject to further review. No contempt finding was entered against the state for its actions.

The per curiam order did not address broader questions of judicial hierarchy beyond the specific facts presented. It limited its discussion to the presumption of good faith and the effect of a vacated order on subsequent intent analysis.

Justice Sotomayor dissented. She wrote that Alabama had acted in defiance of the district court's earlier order, which had been affirmed by the Supreme Court in Allen v. Milligan. The dissent described the state's conduct as gamesmanship that undermined the rule of law and argued that Alabama should have first complied with the preliminary injunction before litigating the merits of any replacement map. Justice Sotomayor quoted remarks by the Speaker of the Alabama House of Representatives indicating that state officials viewed the 5-4 decision in Allen as potentially subject to reconsideration by a differently composed Court.

The dissent further stated that Alabama could have drawn a map containing a second opportunity district, proceeded to trial on the merits, and raised its legal arguments at that stage or on appeal. It characterized the state's decision to enact a different map and seek Supreme Court review as an improper attempt to bypass ordinary procedures.

Alabama's position, reflected in its emergency filing, rested on the fact that the district court's remedial order had been vacated. State officials argued that a vacated order carries no ongoing legal force and cannot serve as the basis for an inference of discriminatory purpose when the state declines to follow it. They pointed to the sequence in Allen v. Milligan, in which the Supreme Court had previously reviewed and altered the scope of relief ordered by the district court.

The litigation has followed a pattern seen in other voting rights and redistricting cases. In Callais, Louisiana advanced arguments that ultimately prevailed at the Supreme Court after an initial district court ruling. In Allen itself, the case returned to the Court multiple times on questions of remedy and scope. Similar dynamics occurred in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, where a state enacted a statute to test the continued validity of earlier precedent.

The Supreme Court's order leaves the underlying Section 2 claims for further proceedings in the district court or on subsequent appeal. It does not resolve the merits of the new maps or determine whether they satisfy the requirements of the Voting Rights Act. The case remains subject to the ordinary processes of litigation, including any future petitions for certiorari on the final judgment.

Lower courts continue to operate under the requirement that their orders, once vacated by a higher court, no longer bind the parties. States and other litigants retain the ability to seek appellate review, including emergency relief, when they believe a district court order rests on an incorrect legal premise. The June 3 order applies that principle to the specific question of how a vacated order may be used in assessing legislative intent.