Strait of Hormuz Tolls Spark Debate on U.S. Role in Law of the Sea Treaty

By Timothy Noah

*Published: 2026-04-10*

Forty-six years ago, as a summer intern recently out of college, I proposed writing my first article for *The New Republic* on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The editor, Michael Kinsley, advised against it, describing the topic as highly uninteresting. I heeded that advice for nearly half a century, but recent developments in the Strait of Hormuz have brought the treaty back into focus.

Earlier this week, ABC News correspondent Jonathan Karl asked President Donald Trump about reports that Iran was imposing fees or requiring coordination for ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Trump responded by suggesting the United States consider imposing its own tolls there as a means of securing the strait and deterring threats from Iran and others. Later that day, Trump spokesperson Karoline Leavitt clarified that the administration seeks Iran's full reopening of the strait without any restrictions, including tolls.

These developments occur amid the ongoing conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran, which began on February 28, 2026, with U.S. and Israeli strikes targeting Iranian nuclear facilities, leadership figures, and missile sites. The strikes followed months of escalations involving attacks by Iranian-backed proxies, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and Houthi forces in Yemen, on Israeli and U.S. interests. A partial ceasefire is currently in effect, but disruptions in the strait persist, with Trump urging European allies to assist in restoring unrestricted passage as negotiations continue.

Both Iran's reported fees and any U.S. consideration of tolls raise questions under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which neither the United States nor Iran has ratified. UNCLOS, adopted in 1982, establishes rules for navigation, including "innocent passage" through a coastal state's territorial sea. Passage qualifies as innocent if it does not prejudice the peace, good order, or security of the coastal state. Prohibited activities include military exercises, willful serious pollution, or fishing, though exceptions exist for services provided to ships, such as navigation through man-made canals.

Panama and Egypt, for instance, charge fees exceeding $1 million for large tankers transiting the Panama and Suez Canals, respectively. These charges support the canals' construction and maintenance. A separate precedent applies to the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits: The 1936 Montreux Convention, negotiated under the League of Nations, permits Turkey to levy tolls. This arrangement was designed to secure Turkey's cooperation during the lead-up to World War II, following its alliance with Germany in World War I.

The innocent passage principle supports global commerce and maritime security. Post-World War II, the United States has historically acted to uphold freedom of navigation, though its naval presence has declined, with the fleet now at about half its Cold War size. A notable example occurred 39 years ago during the Iran-Iraq War, when the U.S. reflagged Kuwaiti tankers and provided warship escorts through the Strait of Hormuz to counter Iranian threats. The operation protected some shipments but included the accidental downing of Iran Air Flight 655, a civilian airliner, resulting in 290 deaths.

The current situation in the Strait of Hormuz illustrates challenges in maintaining open sea lanes. With the partial ceasefire and ongoing diplomatic efforts involving European nations, questions have arisen about allied coordination. The U.S. non-ratification of UNCLOS has fueled debate, though the U.S. Navy adheres to many of its provisions—particularly innocent passage—as customary international law, with relevant rules codified in U.S. domestic legislation.

The U.S. decision not to join UNCLOS traces back to 1982, when President Ronald Reagan declined to sign due to concerns over deep-sea mining regulations, a commercial activity that has not materialized on a large scale. In 1994, after UNCLOS amendments addressed mining issues, President Bill Clinton signed the treaty and sent it to the Senate. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Claiborne Pell did not advance it before Republicans gained control in 1995, with Jesse Helms assuming the chairmanship and halting progress.

President George W. Bush expressed support for the treaty, but Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist did not schedule a vote. When Democrats regained the Senate in 2007, the treaty still lacked the bipartisan support needed to overcome a filibuster. By then, partisan divisions had intensified. A 2007 Heritage Foundation memo, co-authored by Edwin Meese, opposed ratification, arguing that UNCLOS, as a UN-negotiated multilateral treaty, could expose the U.S. to unaccountable international bodies and bloc voting that might constrain American sovereignty.

President Barack Obama sought to advance the treaty, but Republican opposition prevailed. Today, the United States remains the only NATO member not to have ratified UNCLOS, though it complies with core navigation rules. This stance has drawn scrutiny amid the Hormuz disruptions and broader alliance dynamics.

Without a binding treaty framework, some observers worry that Iran's fees could set a precedent for tolls elsewhere. Potential parallels include the Strait of Taiwan (controlled by China and Taiwan), the Strait of Gibraltar (between Morocco and Spain), and the Strait of Malacca (near Indonesia). A U.S.-imposed toll in Hormuz, if pursued, could similarly challenge norms.

Proponents of U.S. ratification argue it would strengthen legal claims to freedom of navigation, especially as U.S. naval capacity evolves. Critics maintain that customary law suffices and that formal accession risks ceding influence to international institutions. The Strait of Hormuz impasse underscores these tensions, highlighting the treaty's relevance nearly five decades after my initial encounter with the topic.

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