Ending The War In Iran Means Winning, Nothing Less

Interview Examines U.S. Military Strategy Options in Ongoing Conflict with Iran

In a 1955 essay later collected in “Men at War,” Ernest Hemingway observed that once war begins, the sole objective becomes victory, as defeat produces outcomes worse than those encountered during hostilities. On August 3, 2026, Rebeccah Heinrichs, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and director of its Keystone Defense Initiative, discussed U.S. policy choices in the current conflict with Iran during an extended interview with Ben Domenech of The Daily Wire. Heinrichs focuses on U.S. national defense policy, strategic deterrence, and related topics. The conversation addressed immediate decisions facing the administration, target selection, munitions constraints, and the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Domenech opened by noting differing views inside and outside the administration on how to conclude the conflict. Heinrichs stated that risks exist across all available options, including diplomatic efforts and resumed military operations. She described one option as expanding the target list beyond prior operations, referred to in the interview as Epic Fury, to include infrastructure supporting the IRGC. Specific categories mentioned included bridges, energy facilities, and both leadership and rank-and-file personnel of the IRGC. Heinrichs noted that during earlier phases of operations conducted jointly with Israel, U.S. strikes concentrated on weapons systems while Israeli forces addressed certain leadership targets.

The discussion turned to Iranian responses observed since the start of intensified operations. Heinrichs said Iranian forces have employed drones against shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and placed mines in the waterway. She indicated that an international arrangement to keep the strait open would have been preferable before mines were laid, though no such arrangement was in place. Heinrichs argued that addressing remaining IRGC capabilities directly would be necessary to alter the current dynamic, and she questioned whether separate negotiating tracks with figures such as Mohammed Ghalibaf could succeed while other IRGC elements remained operational. She described the IRGC as a single organizational structure rather than independent factions.

Domenech raised the question of munitions stocks, particularly longer-range systems such as Tomahawk missiles and THAAD interceptors. Heinrichs acknowledged shortages in those categories while stating that shorter-range munitions remain available in greater quantities. She argued that conserving specific munitions for a potential future contingency with another state would not alter the requirement to address the present campaign. Heinrichs added that Iranian drone activity along the coast has continued because certain IRGC commanders, including Ahmad Vahidi, remain in position.

The interview addressed possible defensive measures against drones. Heinrichs said some advisers have expressed concern that broader strikes on regime personnel could reduce incentives for negotiation or trigger additional retaliation. She countered that Iranian forces have already conducted attacks on U.S. personnel at locations including a base in Jordan and have fired on vessels. Heinrichs suggested that each intercepted Iranian missile should prompt a response calibrated as if the intercept had not occurred. She cited a reported Ukrainian strike on a vessel carrying Russian weapons toward Iran and the Iranian decision not to escalate in that instance, attributing the Iranian restraint to Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy infrastructure.

Domenech asked why larger munitions such as the MOAB had not been employed against IRGC headquarters. Heinrichs replied that some officials believe such strikes would increase the scale of violence or extend the duration of operations. She characterized one perspective within the administration as favoring withdrawal over continued engagement, describing that view as treating diplomacy or cessation of operations as the remaining alternatives. Heinrichs stated that Iranian objectives include U.S. departure from the region and control over transit through the Strait of Hormuz.

The conversation also covered coordination with Israel. Heinrichs described earlier joint operations as effective in using Israeli intelligence to locate targets, including elements of the Basij, a force associated with internal security functions. She noted a subsequent reduction in Israeli involvement and said public support for the campaign had declined during periods of diplomatic pauses. Heinrichs argued that decisive action against the IRGC’s centers of power would not equate to strikes on the Iranian population, which she distinguished from the regime’s security apparatus. She added that the regular Iranian army has not been viewed as the ideological core of the government and referenced earlier public statements by Central Command leadership suggesting efforts to encourage defections from that force.

Throughout the interview, Heinrichs presented expanded targeting of IRGC-linked infrastructure and personnel as the approach most likely to alter Iranian behavior. Domenech questioned why negotiations would be pursued from a position short of demonstrated maximum pressure. Heinrichs agreed that restraint had not produced the intended diplomatic results and reiterated that the Iranian population itself seeks changes in governance. The discussion concluded without resolution of the policy choices under consideration by the administration.

The interview contained no statements from officials currently serving in the administration or from representatives of Iran. No independent assessment of munitions inventories, operational outcomes, or Iranian decision-making processes was provided during the exchange.