9/11 at 25: How the ‘War on Terror’ helped mainstream Europe’s far right

Post-9/11 Security Measures and Shifts in European Party Politics

Twenty-five years after the September 11 attacks, policies developed in response to those events continue to influence European political debates. The Global War on Terror framework coincided with increased electoral support for parties that had previously emphasized opposition to immigration and Islam. Pre-2001, several far-right parties operated on the margins of European multi-party systems. Some recorded notable vote shares yet faced exclusion from coalitions, often due to associations with anti-Semitism or earlier fascist movements.

Prior to the attacks, certain parties had already redirected focus toward Muslim populations. The French National Front, later renamed National Rally, and Austria’s Freedom Party shifted rhetoric from broader racial categories to specific claims about Muslim communities, substituting references to Arabs or Turks with the term “Muslims.” In the Netherlands, the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy raised concerns in 1991 about Islam’s compatibility with liberal institutions and immigrant integration. Pim Fortuyn published *Against the Islamisation of Our Culture* in the late 1990s.

The September 11 attacks killed 2,977 people when al-Qaeda operatives hijacked four aircraft. President George W. Bush launched military operations framed as a Global War on Terror. More than 13 European states participated in the Afghanistan campaign beginning in 2001, with the United Kingdom committing substantial ground forces. Twelve countries joined the 2003 Iraq operation; the United Kingdom and Poland supplied major combat contingents, while France and Germany declined to participate.

Subsequent attacks occurred in Europe. The March 2004 Madrid bombings killed 191 people and were linked to al-Qaeda-inspired networks. The July 2005 London bombings killed 52. European governments introduced domestic programs including the United Kingdom’s Prevent strategy, aimed at identifying individuals at risk of radicalization. Several states hosted or facilitated CIA rendition flights and detention facilities. Guantanamo Bay held detainees, many later released without charges, under legal procedures later challenged in U.S. courts.

Individuals such as Pamela Geller, Frank Gaffney, Daniel Pipes, and Robert Spencer promoted analyses linking Islamic doctrine to security risks. These figures participated in conferences organized under the “Counter-Jihad” label starting around 2007, including events tied to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Human Dimension Implementation Meetings. Parallel initiatives, such as the 2008 Cities Against Islamisation network, coordinated opposition to new mosque construction across multiple countries.

Electoral outcomes shifted over the following decades. Parties with platforms critical of Muslim immigration entered governing coalitions in Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Finland. In Denmark and Sweden, they influenced legislation from outside formal cabinets. National Rally in France and the Freedom Party in Austria recorded repeated gains in parliamentary and presidential contests.

Governments enacted measures restricting visible religious practices. France prohibited full-face veils in public spaces in 2010 and later restricted religious symbols in schools and public employment. Similar veil and hijab rules appeared in Belgium, Austria, and parts of Germany and Switzerland. Several municipalities imposed limits on mosque size or location. These policies applied to Muslim populations that constitute a higher share of lower-income residents in many countries.

Public opinion surveys conducted by national statistical agencies and research institutes during this period recorded elevated concerns about immigration and integration in multiple member states. Official data from interior ministries documented continued involvement of individuals from Muslim backgrounds in both terrorist plots and certain categories of violent crime in several countries, though overall crime rates varied by nation and time frame.

Some governments expanded monitoring of mosques and Muslim civil society groups under headings such as “political Islam” in Austria, “Islamist separatism” in France, and “legalistic Islamism” in Germany. These programs included requirements for transparency in foreign funding and limits on certain forms of religious instruction. Proponents cited security assessments; critics argued the measures singled out one religious community.

Far-right parties incorporated references to demographic change, including versions of the “great replacement” thesis, into campaign materials. Mainstream parties in several countries adopted stricter immigration platforms in response to polling and electoral pressure. The sequence of events shows both the expansion of security-related policies after 2001 and the parallel growth of parties that had long advocated reduced Muslim immigration.